

October 26, 2026

The Honorable Steven M. Colloton
Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Thomas F. Eagleton United States Courthouse
111 South 10th Street
St. Louis, MO 63102

Re. STATEMENT OF FORMER JUDGES ON THE SEPTEMBER 30, 2026 JUDICIAL
MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT AGAINST MINNESOTA FEDERAL JUDGES

Dear Chief Judge Colloton and Members of the Court:

The undersigned are 174 former federal and state court judges from across the United States. We write concerning the judicial misconduct complaint filed on September 30, 2026 by the Attorney General, the Acting Deputy Attorney General, and the Associate Attorney General against Chief Judge Patrick J. Schiltz, Judge John R. Tunheim, and five unnamed judges of the District of Minnesota, arising from a September 17, 2026 *New York Times* article about that court's experience during Operation Metro Surge. In our view, the complaint does not allege conduct that is cognizable misconduct under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364, and it should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A) and Rules 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) of the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings. The Department's further request that the judges be excluded prospectively from all matters involving the Department of Homeland Security is not relief the Act provides and should be denied.

We recognize that the Rules make no provision for submissions of this kind, and that the Chief Judge is free to disregard this one. The Act permits the Chief Judge, in conducting the limited inquiry it authorizes, to communicate with “any other person who may have knowledge of the matter,” 28 U.S.C. § 352(a); Rule 11(b). We offer this statement in that spirit. We claim no knowledge of the facts beyond the complaint, which the Department has elected to make public notwithstanding Rule 23, and the published article on which the complaint relies. The Department's decision to publicize its complaint has placed before the public a question on which former judges have something to contribute: How judges who were bound by the Code of Conduct, and who administered it, understand the line between discussing the administration of their courts and commenting on the merits of cases before them, and how a reasonable observer familiar with judicial practice would regard the statements at issue.

The complaint quotes several statements of the judges: Judge Schiltz described the administration's “disregard for court orders,” said that noncompliance had brought his courthouse to a “near standstill,” and warned that repeated defiance of judicial orders placed “the

constitutional order at risk” and threatened “anarchy or . . . authoritarianism.” Complaint at 2. Judge Tunheim said of the arrests made during the operation: “They weren’t arresting, in my view, [people] who were dangerous criminals on the street.” *Id.* The article reports that Judge Schiltz expressly declined to discuss pending cases. See Mattathias Schwartz, *Trump’s Minnesota Surge Threatened Democracy, Judge Warns*, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2026), <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/17/us/politics/minnesota-judge-trump-immigration.html>.

Three points follow. *First*, the statements did not comment “on the merits” of any pending matter, were not partisan, and would not cause a reasonable and informed observer to question the judges’ impartiality. They addressed the functioning of a federal court under extraordinary circumstances and the government’s compliance with its orders, subjects the Code and the Committee on Codes of Conduct expressly recognize as proper for judicial speech. Two chief judges have dismissed materially similar complaints by the same complainant within the past year. *Second*, it is the complaint that addresses the merits of prior cases, attacking the correctness of the district court’s habeas rulings, attacks which are excluded from the Act by its terms. *Third*, the request for categorical recusal seeks relief the Act does not authorize and that belongs, if anywhere, in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455 in a particular case.

I. BACKGROUND: THE ACT, THE RULES, AND THE DEPARTMENT’S PRIOR COMPLAINTS

The Act permits complaints alleging conduct “prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 351(a). Rule 4(a) identifies categories of cognizable misconduct, among them “making inappropriately partisan statements,” Rule 4(a)(1)(D), and Rule 4(b)(1) of the Rules for Judicial Conduct and Judicial Disability Proceedings[NG1.1] excludes any allegation “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling,” including a failure to recuse. The Code of Conduct elaborates upon the standard the Act and the Rules prescribe. Rule 4 cmt. The Act’s application to extrajudicial speech is correspondingly limited. A judge’s public statements may be cognizable misconduct only if they comment on the merits of pending matters, are inappropriately partisan, or otherwise undermine public confidence in the judge’s impartiality. Attacks on the correctness of a judge’s rulings, by contrast, are excluded from the Act by Rule 4(b)(1).¹

¹ [1] Under Rule 11(b), the Chief Judge may conduct a limited inquiry to determine whether the allegations are supported by the available evidence and whether, taken as true, they constitute misconduct, but may not make findings of fact on genuinely disputed material issues. Where the content of a judge’s extrajudicial statement is itself in dispute, a special committee may be required. See *In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct*, 769 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. Jud. Council 2014) (adopting the report of a special committee appointed to determine the contents of a judge’s unrecorded lecture). Here there is nothing to find. The Department’s complaint rests on quotations from a published article, and the Department does not contend that the judges said anything other than what the article reports. The only question is whether those words, taken as the Department presents them, are misconduct.

The complainant has twice in the past year presented chief judges with complaints of this kind, and both were dismissed at this stage. Chief Judge Sutton of the Sixth Circuit, designated by the Chief Justice to consider the Department's complaint against Chief Judge Boasberg of the District of Columbia, dismissed it on two grounds. He found that the Department had not substantiated its account of what Judge Boasberg said. He further concluded that, even taking the Department's account as true, "a judge's expression of anxiety about executive-branch compliance with judicial orders" did not violate Canon 3A(6), Canon 2A, or the Rules. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 06-25-90174, slip op. at 5–6 (Dec. 19, 2025) (Sutton, C.J., by designation). Chief Judge Sutton further observed that the Chief Justice's 2024 Year-End Report had voiced the same concern, and emphasized that where the Department's real grievance was with the court's substantive rulings, "[j]udicial-misconduct proceedings are not a substitute for the normal appellate review process." *Id.* at 6. Chief Judge Srinivasan of the D.C. Circuit dismissed the Department's complaint against Judge Reyes on the ground that a party's concerns about a judge's impartiality are to be raised by a recusal motion in the case, where "the standards for resolving the matter are well established," rather than through the misconduct process. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. DC-25-90005, slip op. at 5–6 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 29, 2025) (Srinivasan, C.J.).

II. THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT COMMENT "ON THE MERITS" OF A PENDING MATTER

Canon 3A(6) provides that a judge "should not make public comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending in any court." The Canon protects litigants from a judge's publicly prejudging questions that remain for decision, or defending a ruling through the press while it is under review, and its commentary extends that protection through the appellate process. *United States v. Microsoft Corp.*, 253 F.3d 34, 107–17 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc), illustrates the harm: a trial judge who had given secret interviews about the parties and the merits of a case still before him. The Canon is not, however, a subject-matter restriction. It does not forbid discussion of immigration enforcement because immigration cases are pending, any more than it forbids discussion of sentencing policy because sentencing appeals are pending.

In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 769 F.3d 762, 788–89 (D.C. Cir. Jud. Council 2014), illustrates the Canon's application. The Judicial Council asked, as separate questions, whether cases were pending, whether the remarks addressed their merits, whether a recognized exception applied, and whether the remarks nonetheless undermined confidence in the judge's impartiality. *Id.* A pending case is necessary to a Canon 3A(6) violation but is not sufficient; the inquiry is into what the judge actually said and whether it addressed a question a court must decide.

Measured against that standard, Judge Schiltz's statements were not comment on the merits of anything. The article reports that he expressly declined to discuss pending cases. He instead discussed the burden on his court, the government's failure to comply with its orders,

threats against judges, and the consequences for the rule of law of a litigant's refusal to obey the judicial process. The complaint quotes his remarks about staffing, resources, and compliance, but it identifies no statement in which he said that any detainee should prevail, resolved any disputed question of jurisdiction or statutory construction, or urged an appellate court to sustain one of his rulings. Complaint at 2–3, 5.

Indeed, those subjects are part of the Chief Judge's official responsibilities. A chief judge is charged with the administration of the court, 28 U.S.C. § 136, and the Code directs every judge to "diligently discharge administrative responsibilities," Canon 3B(1). Canon 3A(6) itself accepts "public statements made in the course of the judge's official duties" and "explanations of court procedures," and Canon 4A(1) authorizes judges to speak and write about "the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice." A chief judge who explains to the public that his court's caseload has multiplied, that its resources are strained, that its judges face threats, and that the court cannot function if its orders are not obeyed is describing the administration of his court. That is a statement in the course of official duties, not a comment on the merits of a case.

The Department may respond that the noncompliance Judge Schiltz described was the subject of orders that were, or might become, the subject of appellate review, and that a judge may not defend a contested ruling through the press. The commentary to Canon 3A(6) does address that concern, and we take it seriously. But there is a difference between defending the correctness of a ruling and simply acknowledging that it exists. The noncompliance Judge Schiltz described was not a matter of private opinion; it was the subject of findings in the public orders of his court. He did not argue to *The New York Times* that those findings were correct, that the government's appellate arguments were wrong, or that the Eighth Circuit should sustain him. He described what his court had already found, in a published opinion justifying its orders and what the consequences of noncompliance were for the court's operation. A judge who reports what has already been adjudicated in public is not litigating his case in the newspaper.

The Department's contrary position reduces to the proposition that because habeas litigation arising from Operation Metro Surge was pending, including on cases on appeal, any public discussion of the operation's impact on the administration of the court was to comment on the merits of that litigation. That is the subject-matter rule, not found in the Canon. The Code distinguishes between adjudicative commentary and discussion of judicial administration. Its exceptions for official-duty statements and speeches about the administration of justice foreclose the conclusion that judges must be silent about the operation of their courts just because those courts have cases arising from the same events.

III. THE CODE AND THE COMMITTEE ON CODES OF CONDUCT RECOGNIZE THAT JUDGES MAY SPEAK ABOUT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND COMPLIANCE WITH JUDICIAL ORDERS

Canon 1 instructs that “[a] Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary,” and its commentary directs that the Code be construed to further that objective. Canon 4A(1) permits judges to speak, write, lecture, and teach about the law and the administration of justice. These provisions complement the limits in Canons 2A and 3A(6) by establishing that public discussion of the judicial institution is a recognized part of judicial service rather than a presumptive ethical violation just because it happened to attract controversy.

The Committee on Codes of Conduct addressed this subject directly in *Advisory Opinion No. 118, Ethics Considerations Related to Public Speech and Civic Engagement by Judges* (Feb. 12, 2026). The Committee advised that the Code permits judges “to speak or write about the independence of the judiciary, or advocate for the rule of law in general”; that judges may address judicial security, public confidence in the judiciary as a coequal branch, and the need to respond to illegitimate criticism and threats; and that the Code leaves room “for the measured defense of judicial colleagues” against attacks that threaten judicial independence. The Committee also cautioned that judges must avoid partisan politics, demeaning or acrimonious rhetoric, and commentary that could raise questions about their impartiality, and that they should attend to tone and context. The opinion does not license political advocacy, and it does not relax Canon 3A(6). It is significant because it represents a statement by the judiciary’s own ethics authority rejecting the proposition that silence is required when the independence or functioning of a court is threatened.

The New York Times interviews fall within that recognized space. A court that cannot secure compliance with its orders cannot perform its constitutional function, and a judge who explains that fact is addressing the administration of justice in the most basic sense. Chief Judge Sutton’s order in the Boasberg matter recognized as much in treating a judge’s “expression of anxiety about executive-branch compliance with judicial orders” as within the range of what judges may properly discuss. Slip op. at 5. Judicial impartiality does not require a court to feign indifference to whether its orders are obeyed.

IV. THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT “INAPPROPRIATELY PARTISAN”

The complaint’s central characterization is that the interviews were “political.” The Rules make “inappropriately partisan statements” cognizable misconduct, Rule 4(a)(1)(D), and Canon 5 forbids political activity. Partisanship, in the sense the Code uses the term, concerns allegiance to a political party, candidate, or faction, or advocacy of a contested political position. It does not describe a judge’s assessment of a litigant’s compliance with court orders.

Under both Democratic and Republican administrations, courts have found the United States to have violated court orders, acted beyond its statutory authority, or failed to meet its burdens. They have said so in published opinions that are often sharply worded. Such findings, grounded in a factual record, are not partisan. Nor does a judge become partisan by stating outside the courtroom what his court has found inside it. The Department’s theory would make

any public reference to executive noncompliance “political” whenever the executive is the party not complying. That rule would not protect the judiciary’s nonpartisanship; it would make the judiciary’s ability to describe threats to its own authority depend on the preferences of the branch threatening them.

Advisory Opinion No. 118 draws the line in the right place: judges may speak about judicial independence, the rule of law, and compliance with judicial process, but must avoid partisan rhetoric and electoral politics. The quoted statements concern the former and contain nothing of the latter.

V. THE STATEMENTS DO NOT CREATE A REASONABLE APPEARANCE OF PARTIALITY

Canon 2A requires judges to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. A judge may avoid comment on the merits of a pending case and still, through public statements, reasonably suggest prejudgment, hostility toward a litigant, or partisan commitment. Compliance with Canon 3A(6) does not end the Canon 2A inquiry. The appearance standard is an objective one, asking whether a reasonable person, fully informed of the circumstances, would question the judge’s impartiality. Canon 2A cmt.

The informed observer would know that the judges were describing a period of extraordinary demands on their court and, in Judge Schiltz’s case, violations of court orders that the court had already found in public proceedings. A judge who accurately describes noncompliance that his court has adjudicated has not displayed hostility toward the noncompliant party; he has displayed fidelity to his court’s orders. Judges must identify, criticize, and remedy violations of their orders as a routine part of their work, and such findings do not ordinarily disqualify them from later proceedings involving the same party. *Liteky v. United States*, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994). The Department’s proposed rule would create a perverse incentive: a litigant’s defiance of a court’s orders would become the basis for removing the judge once the judge explained the consequences of that defiance.

The Eighth Circuit’s own precedent confirms that press contact by a judge, even where unwise, does not without more establish an appearance of partiality warranting disqualification. In *White v. National Football League*, 585 F.3d 1129, 1138–41 (8th Cir. 2009), the court considered a district judge’s public comments to the press about long-running litigation before him and concluded that, although such contacts raised legitimate concerns, they did not require recusal under § 455(a). If comments about the parties and proceedings in a judge’s own pending case did not create a disqualifying appearance of partiality in *White*, statements about courthouse administration and compliance with orders cannot do so here.

We address separately the two statements on which the Department places the greatest weight. The first is Judge Schiltz’s warning that repeated defiance of judicial orders placed “the

constitutional order at risk” and threatened “anarchy or . . . authoritarianism.” That language is forceful, and Advisory Opinion No. 118 rightly counsels judges to attend to tone. But the statement is not directed at a party, a policy, or a political figure. It is a statement about consequences: that a system in which court orders are not obeyed ceases to be a system of law. That proposition is neither controversial, nor partisan; the Chief Justice has made the same point. A warning that systematic defiance of court orders endangers constitutional government is a statement about the rule of law, not a declaration that the government must lose every immigration case. We also note that the article’s headline, which the complaint invokes, was written by the newspaper. Judges are responsible for what they say, not for how an editor summarizes it.

The second is Judge Tunheim’s remark that the operation “weren’t arresting, in my view, [people] who were dangerous criminals on the street.” This too is not comment on the merits of a pending matter; nor does it reasonably suggest partiality. Read in context, the remark is a description of the detainees whose cases came before the court, as the judge observed them in the performance of his duties. It is phrased in the past tense, about what the operation did, not about what any court should do. It does not state that any petitioner should be released, that the government lacks authority to detain anyone, or that any question of law should be resolved in any way. If a judge may state in a published opinion that a particular detainee posed no danger, he does not display partiality by observing, in general terms, that the detainees who came before his court were not, in the main, dangerous criminals. The reasonable observer, who knows that judges form and express such views as a routine incident of their work, would not conclude from that remark that Judge Tunheim could not fairly decide the next petition on its own record. Indeed, a judge’s opinion about the parties who have already appeared before him, formed from what he has seen in the course of judicial proceedings, is precisely the kind of opinion *Liteky* holds does not warrant disqualification. It is not “extrajudicial” in source and does not reflect “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.” 510 U.S. at 555.

VI. THE COMPLAINT’S ATTACK ON THE DISTRICT COURT’S RULINGS IS EXCLUDED BY THE ACT

Much of the complaint is devoted to the proposition that the district court wrongly entertained habeas petitions, misconstrued the immigration statutes, and issued orders the Eighth Circuit later reversed. Complaint at 4–6. Those are contentions about the merits of judicial decisions. Rule 4(b)(1) excludes them, and § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii) requires their dismissal. They are not themselves misconduct and cannot be made so by characterization. Reversal is a feature of a functioning judicial system, not evidence of a lack of integrity or impartiality in the judge reversed.

The exclusion is particularly important here because the Department uses its own view of disputed legal questions, whether detention was authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1225, whether petitions were filed in the proper district, whether classwide relief was available, to recast the judges’

institutional concerns as political animus. Those questions were for the courts; the Eighth Circuit has addressed them through the appellate process. Chief Judge Sutton's order illustrates the principle. As he explained, allegations that a judge improperly exercised jurisdiction or disregarded appellate instructions ordinarily concern the merits of judicial rulings and therefore fall outside the misconduct process; and, quoting the Supreme Court, "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion." Slip op. at 5–6 (quoting *Liteky*, 510 U.S. at 555). Judicial misconduct proceedings are not a substitute for appellate review. A contrary rule would subject judges to disciplinary complaints whenever they decided a difficult question against the government and were later reversed, which is what the Act's merits exclusion exists to prevent.

VII. THE REQUESTED CATEGORICAL RECUSAL IS NOT RELIEF THE ACT PROVIDES

The Department asks that Judges Schiltz and Tunheim, and any other judge who spoke with *The New York Times*, be removed from all current and future matters involving the Department of Homeland Security. Complaint at 6. Apart from the complaint's failure on the merits, that request should be denied because the Act does not authorize that relief, and the Chief Judge could not grant it at this stage in any event.

The remedies available under § 354 are those a judicial council may impose after a special committee has investigated and reported. They do not include the prospective exclusion of a judge from cases involving a particular litigant or subject. Section 354(a)(2)(A)(i) permits a council to order that no further cases be assigned to a judge "for a time certain," a temporary and general measure; it does not permit a council to carve a single litigant's cases out of a judge's docket indefinitely. The Chief Judge's authority at the limited-inquiry stage is narrower still: the Chief Judge may dismiss the complaint, conclude the proceeding on the basis of voluntary corrective action, or appoint a special committee, Rule 11(c)–(f), and has no power to impose a remedy of any kind.

Disqualification is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 455 and is determined case by case, in the actual factual and procedural context of a particular proceeding, by motion to the judge and review on appeal or mandamus. Rule 4(b)(1) confirms that a judge's failure to recuse is a merits question outside the purview of misconduct proceedings. That is the ground on which Chief Judge Srinivasan dismissed the Department's complaint against Judge Reyes. When a party questions a judge's impartiality, the ordinary procedure is to seek recusal in the underlying case, where "the standards for resolving the matter are well established." Slip op. at 6. "[A] misconduct proceeding is not meant to function in that way—*i.e.*, as an alternate means by which a party in a pending case could bring about the judge's recusal." *Id.* at 5. The Department has that avenue available in every DHS matter before every judge of the District of Minnesota. It has not explained why the ordinary mechanism is inadequate. A motion under § 455 would be decided under *Liteky*, which holds that judicial assessments of a party's conduct, even severe

ones, do not warrant disqualification absent “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” 510 U.S. at 555. The Act does not permit a litigant to obtain through a misconduct complaint what it could not obtain under that standard.

The consequences of granting the request would reach well beyond this complaint. If an institutional litigant could obtain the prospective removal of judges from a class of cases by filing a misconduct complaint about their public statements, every such litigant would have an incentive to do so. Which judges may hear the government’s case would come to depend on the government’s willingness to file complaints. The Act was not designed to permit that, and the Chief Judge should not permit it here.

CONCLUSION

The undersigned submit that the complaint alleges no cognizable misconduct: the facts are undisputed and present no occasion for a special committee; the statements did not comment on the merits of pending matters, were not partisan, and would not lead a reasonable and informed observer to doubt the judges’ impartiality; the attack on the district court’s rulings is excluded by Rule 4(b)(1); and the categorical recusal requested is relief the Act does not provide. The complaint should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A) and Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B).

Respectfully submitted,

Judge Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge, District of Massachusetts (Ret.)

Federal

Judge Nancy F. Atlas, U.S. District Judge, Southern District of Texas (Ret.)

Judge Mark W. Bennett, U.S. District Judge, Northern District of Iowa (Ret.)

Chief Judge John W. Bissell, U.S. District Judge, District of New Jersey (Ret.)

Judge Geraldine Soat Brown, U.S. Magistrate Judge, Northern District of Illinois (Ret.)

Chief Judge Rubén Castillo, U.S. District Judge, Northern District of Illinois (Ret.)

Judge Robert J. Cindrich, U.S. District Judge, Western District of Pennsylvania (Ret.)

Chief Judge U.W. Clemon, U.S. District Judge, Northern District of Alabama (Ret.)

Judge Susan E. Cox, U.S. Magistrate Judge, Northern District of Illinois (Ret.)

Judge Morton Denlow, U.S. Magistrate Judge, Northern District of Illinois (Ret.)

Judge Allyson K. Duncan, U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Ret.)

Judge David K. Duncan, U.S. Magistrate Judge, District of Arizona (Ret.)

Judge Gary A. Feess, U.S. District Judge, Central District of California (Ret.)

Chief Judge Sheila Finnegan, U.S. Magistrate Judge, Northern District of Illinois (Ret.)

Judge James C. Francis IV, U.S. Magistrate Judge, Southern District of New York (Ret.)

Judge Royal Furgeson Jr., U.S. District Judge, Western District of Texas (Ret.)

Judge Vanessa D. Gilmore, U.S. District Judge, Southern District of Texas (Ret.)

Judge Marilyn Go, U.S. Magistrate Judge, Eastern District of New York (Ret.)
Judge Steven M. Gold, U.S. Magistrate Judge, Eastern District of New York (Ret.)
Judge A. Benjamin Goldgar, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Northern District of Illinois (Ret.)
Judge Paul W. Grimm, U.S. District Judge, District of Maryland (Ret.)
Chief Judge Randolph J. Haines, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, District of Arizona (Ret.)
Judge Thelton Henderson, U.S. District Judge, Northern District of California (Ret.)
Chief Judge Robert Harlan Henry, U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Ret.)
Judge Faith Hochberg, U.S. District Judge, District of New Jersey (Ret.)
Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle, U.S. District Judge, District of Columbia (Ret.)
Judge John E. Jones III, U.S. District Judge, Middle District of Pennsylvania (Ret.)
Judge Abdul K. Kallon, U.S. District Judge, Northern District of Alabama (Ret.)
Chief Judge George H. King, U.S. District Judge, Central District of California (Ret.)
Judge George H. Lowe, U.S. Magistrate Judge, Northern District of New York (Ret.)
Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn, U.S. District Judge, Northern District of Texas (Ret.)
Judge Roanne L. Mann, U.S. Magistrate Judge, Eastern District of New York (Ret.)
Judge John S. Martin Jr., U.S. District Judge, Southern District of New York (Ret.)
Judge A. Howard Matz, U.S. District Judge, Central District of California (Ret.)
Chief Judge Paul Michel, U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Ret.)
Judge Liam O'Grady, U.S. District Judge, Eastern District of Virginia (Ret.)
Judge Kathleen O'Malley, U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Ret.)
Judge Jamie Orenstein, U.S. Magistrate Judge, Eastern District of New York (Ret.)
Judge Brian Owsley, U.S. Magistrate Judge, Southern District of Texas (Ret.)
Judge Philip M. Pro, U.S. District Judge, District of Nevada (Ret.)
Judge Victoria A. Roberts, U.S. District Judge, Eastern District of Michigan (Ret.)
Judge Fern M. Smith, U.S. District Judge, Northern District of California (Ret.)
Chief Judge Deanell Reece Tacha, U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Ret.)
Judge John D. Tinder, U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Ret.)
Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie, U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Ret.)
Judge T. John Ward, U.S. District Judge, Eastern District of Texas (Ret.)
Judge Paul Watford, U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ret.)
Judge Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge, District of Massachusetts (Ret.)
Judge Lee Yeakel, U.S. District Judge, Western District of Texas (Ret.)

State

Judge Verna A. Adams, Marin County Superior Court, California (Ret.)
Judge Elaine Andrews, Anchorage Superior Court, Alaska (Ret.)
Judge Beth M. Andrus, Washington State Court of Appeals (Ret.)

Judge Stephanie A. Arend, Pierce County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
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Justice Michael P. Donnelly, Supreme Court of Ohio (Ret.)
Judge Kitty-Ann van Doorninck, Pierce County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Justice Fernande R.V. Duffly, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Ret.)
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Judge Julia Garratt, King County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Judge Deborra Garrett, Whatcom County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Justice Janine P. Geske, Wisconsin Supreme Court (Ret.)
Justice Emily Jane Goodman, New York State Supreme Court (Ret.)
Judge Dianna Gould-Saltman, Los Angeles Superior Court, California (Ret.)

Judge Ernestine S. Gray, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, Louisiana (Ret.)
Justice Karen F. Green, Massachusetts Superior Court (Ret.)
Chief Justice Mark V. Green, Massachusetts Appeals Court (Ret.)
Judge Brook Hedge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia (Ret.)
Judge James Hely, New Jersey Superior Court, Vicinage 12 (Ret.)
Judge Bethany G. Hicks, Maricopa County Superior Court, Arizona (Ret.)
Justice Geraldine S. Hines, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Ret.)
Judge Vicki L. Hogan, Pierce County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Judge Laura C. Inveen, King County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Chief Justice Jim Jones, Idaho Supreme Court (Ret.)
Justice Marcy L. Kahn, New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division (Ret.)
Judge Henry Kantor, Multnomah County Circuit Court, Oregon (Ret.)
Judge Steven J. Kleifield, Los Angeles Superior Court, California (Ret.)
Judge Michael S. Kupersmith, Chittenden County Superior Court, Vermont (Ret.)
Judge David A. Kurtz, Snohomish County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Judge Harriet Lansing, Minnesota Court of Appeals (Ret.)
Judge Linda Lau, Washington State Court of Appeals (Ret.)
Chief Judge John P. Leopold, Colorado District Court, 18th Judicial District (Ret.)
Judge Richard A. Levie, Superior Court of the District of Columbia (Ret.)
Judge Keith Levy, Alaska District Court, First District (Ret.)
Judge John Lohrmann, Walla Walla County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Judge Richard Lyman, Los Angeles Superior Court, California (Ret.)
Judge Barbara Mack, King County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Justice Joan Madden, New York State Supreme Court (Ret.)
Chief Justice Eric Magnuson, Minnesota Supreme Court (Ret.)
Judge Patrick J. Mahoney, San Francisco County Superior Court, California (Ret.)
Judge Victoria S. Marks, Hawaii First Circuit Court (Ret.)
Justice Mary Anne Mason, Illinois Appellate Court, First District (Ret.)
Chief Justice Mike McGrath, Montana Supreme Court (Ret.)
Judge Kevin McKenney, Santa Clara County Superior Court, California (Ret.)
Judge Robert Mello, Addison County Superior Court, Vermont (Ret.)
Judge Christopher Melly, Clallam County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Judge John Meyer, Skagit County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Judge Peter Michalski, Anchorage Superior Court, Alaska (Ret.)
Judge Rita Miller, Los Angeles Superior Court, California (Ret.)
Judge David Minge, Minnesota Court of Appeals (Ret.)
Judge Walter M. Morris Jr., Orleans County Superior Court, Vermont (Ret.)
Justice James C. Nelson, Montana Supreme Court (Ret.)
Judge Peggy J. Nelson, Eighth Judicial District Court of New Mexico (Ret.)
Judge Leslie C. Nichols, Santa Clara County Superior Court, California (Ret.)

Judge John B. Van de North Jr., Minnesota District Court, Second Judicial District (Ret.)
Judge Rita M. Novak, Cook County Circuit Court, Illinois (Ret.)
Justice Michael J. Obus, New York County Supreme Court (Ret.)
Associate Justice Robert F. Orr, North Carolina Supreme Court (Ret.)
Judge Gary Oxenhandler, 13th Circuit Court, Missouri (Ret.)
Judge Philip M. Pallenberg, Juneau Superior Court, Alaska (Ret.)
Judge Philip H. Pennypacker, Santa Clara County Superior Court, California (Ret.)
Judge Lynn Pickard, New Mexico Court of Appeals (Ret.)
Judge Maurice Portley, Arizona Court of Appeals (Ret.)
Judge Kathryn L. Quaintance, Hennepin County District Court, Minnesota (Ret.)
Judge Jeffrey M. Ramsdell, King County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Judge Judith H. Ramseyer, King County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Chief Justice Mark Recktenwald, Hawaii Supreme Court (Ret.)
Judge Stephanie Rhoades, Anchorage District Court, Alaska (Ret.)
Justice Rosalyn Richter, New York State Appellate Division, First Department (Ret.)
Judge Palmer Robinson, King County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Judge John Romero, New Mexico 2nd Judicial District Court (Ret.)
Judge David A. Rosen, Los Angeles Superior Court, California (Ret.)
Judge Carol Schapira, King County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Judge Barry C. Schneider, Maricopa County Superior Court, Arizona (Ret.)
Judge Catherine Shaffer, King County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Judge Nan R. Shuker, Superior Court of the District of Columbia (Ret.)
Justice Jacqueline Silbermann, New York County Supreme Court, Civil Branch (Ret.)
Associate Justice Sheila Sonenshine, California Court of Appeal (Ret.)
Judge Michael Spearman, Washington Court of Appeals (Ret.)
Judge Julie Spector, King County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Chief Justice Laura Denvir Stith, Supreme Court of Missouri (Ret.)
Judge Sen Tan, Anchorage Superior Court, Alaska (Ret.)
Chief Justice Marsha Ternus, Iowa Supreme Court (Ret.)
Judge Philip E. Toci, Arizona Court of Appeals (Ret.)
Judge Michael J. Trickey, Washington Court of Appeals (Ret.)
Judge Emily E. Vasquez, Sacramento County Superior Court, California (Ret.)
Judge Art Wang, Washington Court of Appeals (Ret.)
Judge Larry Weeks, Juneau Superior Court, Alaska (Ret.)
International Judge Patricia Whalen, War Crimes Chamber, Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ret.)
Judge Ken Williams, Clallam County Superior Court, Washington (Ret.)
Chief Justice Michael A. Wolff, Supreme Court of Missouri (Ret.)
Judge Frances Q.F. Wong, O'ahu First Circuit Court, Hawaii (Ret.)
Judge Beverly Wood, Marin County Superior Court, California (Ret.)

Judge Margie G. Woods, San Diego County Superior Court, California (Ret.)
Judge Merri Souther Wyatt, Oregon Circuit Court, Multnomah County (Ret.)
Chief Justice Michael Zimmerman, Utah Supreme Court (Ret.)